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REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX:
DO MEN HAVE A SPORTING CHANCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the elimination of sex discrimination in our
society has developed into an issue of considerable importance.
"Women have made great strides in academics, athletics and em-
ployment, continually breaking down glass ceiling barriers."1 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex and other protected classes under Title VII, has been the
primary source of this progress.2 Moreover, Title IX, a provision of
the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in federally funded educational institutions, has led to dra-
matic educational advances for women in recent years.3
The establishment of Title IX in 1972 prompted significant ad-
vancements in the opportunities available to female athletes. 4
Within four years of its implementation, the number of female ath-
letes in the United States increased by 600 percent, to comprise
over two million participants. 5 Consequently, during the 1970s,
1. Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 1107, 1107 (1998) (discussing current status of
Title IX, including recent developments, court decisions and implications for edu-
cation system).
2. See id. at 1129 (discussing progress made under Civil Rights Act); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). This section, which pro-
vides the foundation for Title IX, states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.
Id.
3. See Bredthauer, supra note 1, at 1129 (citing Education Amendments of
1972, §§ 901-909, amended by 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994)).
4. See generally Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics in the 1990's [sic]: Nonrevenue [sic] Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble
for Survival 71 IND. LJ. 773, 773 (1996) (reviewing effects of Title IX on collegiate
athletics).
5. See id. (citing Joan O'Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field: College Football in Utah
Slows Gender Equity's Forward Progress, SALT LAKE Crrv TRaB., Sept. 4, 1994, at Al)
(reviewing women's participation in athletics after passage of Tide IX). Statistics
showed the following breakdowns: "increase in athletic participation of high
school women, 1971-1978: 294,000 to 2,083,000; increase in collegiate women's
intramural sports, 1971-1976: 108 percent; increase in collegiate women's club
sports, 1971-1976: 55 percent; increase in intercollegiate women's sports, 1971-
1976: 102 percent." Id.
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universities across the country expanded women's intercollegiate
athletic programs in order to support this trend of development.
6
Presently, however, this movement is failing to survive because
many universities are facing economic difficulties that prevent the
continuing expansion of women's athletic programs. 7 Women's
teams, in the most extreme cases, are actually being eliminated.8
This is problematic under Title IX because many universities have
not yet fulfilled the required statutory standards.9 Consequently,
women athletes are instituting legal action against these universi-
ties, "seeking either the reinstatement of their eliminated teams or
an expansion in the institution's women's program[s]." 10
In recent cases, women athletes have succeeded in Title IX le-
gal disputes. Throughout the 1990s, circuit courts of appeals have
consistently ruled that universities must take measures to remedy
violations under Title IX. 11 While these decisions are providing wo-
men unprecedented opportunities in intercollegiate athletic pro-
grams, the indirect result is that budgetary restrictions force
universities to reduce the number of roster spots available on men's
athletic teams or, in the alternative, eliminate these teams com-
pletely.12 As a result, many of the less prominent men's athletic
teams are bearing the burden of Title IX compliance.
13
Men's athletic teams are responding by filing reverse discrimi-
nation claims. 14 Thus far, federal courts have refused to find equal
6. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
Brown University's remarkable expansion of women's athletic programs during
1970s); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993)
(noting growth of women's intercollegiate athletic programs at Colorado State
University during 1970s).
7. See Shook, supra note 4, at 773 (discussing universities' economic difficul-
ties and their subsequent inabilities to meet requirements of Title IX).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id. (noting that women athletes bring lawsuits to force compliance with
standards set forth under Tide IX).
11. For a discussion of recent Title IX decisions, see infra notes 68-106 and
accompanying text.
12. See Shook, supra note 4, at 773-74 (stating that federal court rulings under
Title IX indirectly force universities unable to afford athletic expansion to reduce
men's programs).
13. See id. at 774 (noting that "less prominent" teams are those that do not
generate revenue).
14. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no
Title IX violation when university reduced number of roster spots available to male
student-athletes to correct imbalance between each sex's participation in varsity
sports); see also Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
no Title IX violation when university eliminated men's wrestling and soccer
programs).
[Vol. 8: p. 189
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REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX
protection violations in the application of Title IX.15 Therefore,
men's athletic teams at many universities are currently facing the
risk of reduction or termination.1 6
This Comment provides an overview of Title IX and its effects
on the survival of non-revenue athletic teams for male student-ath-
letes. Part II outlines the statutory and regulatory background of
Title IX and focuses on its early judicial interpretations. 17 Part II
also discusses the typical Title IX lawsuit of the 1990s and judicial
responses to these actions. 18 Part III describes the currently unsuc-
cessful reverse discrimination claims resulting from the reduction
and elimination of men's athletic teams.1 9 Part IV assesses the im-
pact of these recent decisions on the future of non-revenue men's
athletic teams. 20
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Title IX
Congress enacted Title IX as part of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972. Title IX provides, in relevant part, that: "[n]o per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimi-
nation under any educational program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .. ".."21 Title IX expressly applies to all pro-
grams and activities at any "public or private preschool, elementary,
or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional,
or higher education."22
15. For further discussion of the federal courts' rejection of alleged equal
protection violations, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 765 (noting university's decision to "adopt
squad-size targets, which would encourage expansion of the women's teams while
limiting the size of the men's teams.").
17. For further discussion of Title IX's statutory and regulatory background,
see infra notes 21-67 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of these lawsuits, see infra notes 68-119 and accom-
panying text.
19. For further discussion of reverse discrimination actions, see infra notes
120-97 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of the impact on the future of non-revenue men's
athletics, see infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994). There are several statutory exclusions under
Title IX, including some religious and military institutions. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (a) (3); 34 C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (2000) (exempting from Title IX educational
institutions controlled by religious organizations to extent that statute is inconsis-
tent with religious tenets of organizations); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (4); 34
C.F.R. § 106.13 (2000) (exempting from Title IX educational institutions devoted
to training individuals for United States military).
2001]
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Initially, there was some uncertainty surrounding Title IX's ap-
plication to institutions of higher education. 23 Universities ques-
tioned whether and how Title IX should be applied within the
realm of collegiate athletics. 24 At its inception, the broad language
of Title IX caused considerable apprehension in the academic
world.2 5 During this period, women's participation in athletic pro-
grams in the United States was growing at an extraordinary rate.26
Despite this unprecedented growth, universities struggled both to
understand and to accommodate the standards set forth in Title
IX. 2 7
The confusion surrounding the extent of "Title IX's coverage
and the acceptable methods of compliance arose from the absence
of secondary legislative materials."28 In 1975, Congress directed the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") to create reg-
ulations explaining Title IX.29 This action was taken in an effort to
provide guidance to university athletic programs. Specifically, these
regulations made it clear that gender discrimination in intercollegi-
ate athletics was in violation of Title IX.3° The focus of the regula-
23. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing
scope of Title IX and effect on university's athletic programs).
24. See id.
25. See id. (noting that universities' anxiety chiefly centered around identify-
ing which individual programs, particularly in terms of athletics, might come
within scope of discrimination provision, and how government would determine
compliance). The Cohen court suggested that, for many schools, the men's football
budget far exceeded that of any other sport, and men's athletics as a whole re-
ceived a far larger portion of the allocated resources. See id. Typically, this share
was vastly disproportionate to the percentage of men in the student body. See id.
26. For a discussion of the increase of women's participation in athletic pro-
grams, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
28. Id. at 893 (stating that "Congress included no committee report with the
final bill and there were apparently only two mentions of intercollegiate athletics
during the congressional debate"); see also Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the
1972 Education Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language with Its Broad Reme-
dial Purpose, 51 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1043, 1050-55, 1057-58 (1983) (discussing legisla-
tive and post-enactment history of Title IX).
29. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893, 895 (defining HEW split, reorganization proce-
dure and placement of subsequent agency authority).
30. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41 (2000). "[I]n 1979 Congress split HEW
into the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department
of Education (DED)." See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895. The existing Title IX regulations
"were left within HHS's arsenal while, at the same time, DED replicated them as
part of its own regulatory armamentarium." Id. Despite this, "DED is the principle
locus of ongoing enforcement activity." Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a) (1) (trans-
ferring all education functions of HEW to DED); 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a) (3) (transfer-
ring education-related Office of Civil Rights work to DED). It is important to note
that HHS's and DED's regulations are identical except for the change in language
necessitated by the splitting of HEW into HHS and DED. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at
895.
[Vol. 8: p. 189
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol8/iss1/7
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX
tions was a section entitled "Equal Opportunity. '"31 Under this
section, HEW stated that a recipient of federal funding "shall pro-
vide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes."3 2 The
regulation provided that the Director of HEW would consider the
following factors in determining whether universities were afford-
ing equal opportunities under Title IX:
(1) whether the selection of sports and levels of competi-
tion effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes; (2) the provision of equipment
and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) travel and per diem allowance; (5) opportunity to re-
ceive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and
compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) provi-
sion of medical and training facilities and services; (9) pro-
vision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10)
publicity.33
Furthermore, HEW explained "that 'unequal expenditures' for
men's and women's teams would not necessarily 'constitute compli-
ance with the section.' 34 Consequently, the interpretation of Title
IX at that point in time appeared to focus on compliance through
equal opportunity instead of compliance through equal
expenditure.3 5
In the three years following the issuance of the regulations,
HEW received numerous discrimination complaints from more
than fifty universities across the nation.36 Consequently, HEW pro-
posed a "Policy Interpretation" of its regulations in order to de-
crease the number of complaints and encourage self-policing at the
university level.3 7 The Policy Interpretation was promulgated in fi-
nal form in 1979, and it stated that Title IX was designed specifi-
cally to address issues within intercollegiate athletics.
3 8
31. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000).
32. Id. § 106.41(c).
33. Id. § 106.41 (c)(1)-(10).
34. Shook, supra note 4, at 776 (citing § 106.41 (c)) (considering HEW's fail-
ure to provide adequate funding for team of one sex in "assessing equality of op-
portunity for members of each sex.").
35. See id.
36. See id. (noting that over one hundred complaints were filed).
37. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (1978)).
38. See id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979)) (noting that Policy Interpreta-
tion gave "more detailed measure of equal opportunity.").
2001]
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The Policy Interpretation suggested three requirements that
must be followed in order to avoid a violation of Title IX.39 First,
universities must comply with "Athletic Financial Assistance (Schol-
arships)."40 Second, universities must comply with "Equivalence in
Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities. ' '41 Finally, universities
must comply with "Effective Accommodation of Student Interests
and Abilities." 42
Moreover, the Policy Interpretation established the "effective
accommodation" test. 4 3 The effective accommodation test stated
that compliance with Title IX could be met in one of three ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
ties for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enroll-
ments; or (2) where the members of one sex have been
and are under-represented [sic] among intercollegiate
athletes, whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interest and abili-
ties of the members of that sex; or (3) where the members
of one sex are under-represented [sic] among intercollegi-
ate athletes, whether the institution cannot show a contin-
uing practice of program expansion which such as that
cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the in-
terests and abilities of the members of that sex have been
fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.44
39. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 (noting that university must meet at least one of
three prongs under Policy Interpretation).
44. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (noting additional factors to be considered). This
Policy Interpretation listed factors such as:
(1) whether the competitive schedules for men's and women's teams, on
a program-wide basis, afford proportionally similar numbers of male and
female athletes equivalently advanced competitive opportunities; or (2)
whether the institution can demonstrate a history and continuing prac-
tice of upgrading the competitive opportunities available to the histori-
cally disadvantaged sex as warranted by the developing abilities among
athletes of that sex.
Id.
Appellate courts have not given much consideration to these factors. Instead
they have focused on the three prongs established in the effective accommodation
test. See id.
[Vol. 8: p. 189
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Despite the regulations presented in 1975 and the Policy Inter-
pretation presented in 1979, uncertainty surrounding the applica-
tion of Title IX still remains. Universities and courts continued to
speculate as to whether Tide IX should be applied to the specific
program receiving federal funding or to the entire educational in-
stitution.45 Specifically at issue was § 1681 (a), which provided that
sex-based discrimination in "any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance" violated Tide IX.46 Whether a
party was in favor of an "institution-wide"47 or a "program-spe-
cific" 48 interpretation of this phrase depended on whether a party
argued for or against compliance with Title IX.49
The United States Supreme Court narrowly construed Title IX
in Grove City College v. Bell.5 0 The Court held that Title IX did not
45. See Bredthauer, supra note 1, at 1108 (discussing interpretation of Title IX
by universities and by Supreme Court).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
47. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that
entire college is brought under Title IX when students receive federal grants),
rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); see also Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding that intercollegiate athletic program was subject to Title IX if
university as whole received federal funds).
48. See Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st
Cir. 1981) (declining to apply Title IX where sex discrimination was not alleged in
specific programs that received federal funding), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982);
see also Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that
University's athletic department was not covered by Title IX if it did not receive
direct federal funding); Othen v. Ann Arbor Sch. Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Mich. 1981), affd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that athletic department
of university was not covered by Title IX).
49. SeeJill K Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial
Interpretation of the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. RiEv. 553, 561 (1994) (noting
that narrow interpretation of "program-specific" disqualified almost all university
athletic departments from Title IX coverage because they rarely collected direct
financial assistance). Supporters of the "institution-wide" viewpoint believe that an
entire educational institution falls under the requirements of Title IX if any part of
the institution receives federal funds. See id. This applies to almost all collegiate
athletic departments because almost all institutions of higher learning receive
some sort of federal aid or admit students who receive federal loans. See id. Sup-
porters of the "program-specific" viewpoint argue that Title IX forbids gender dis-
crimination only in those specific programs or activities that receive direct federal
funding. See id. Therefore, an athletic program did not have to comply with Title
IX if it did not receive any direct federal funding. See id. This severely limits the
number of university athletic departments falling under Title IX. See id. Both in-
terpretations claim to have support in Title IX's legislative history. See id.
50. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (discussing other Supreme Court cases which also
addressed this issue); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,
76 (1992) (approving monetary damages remedy for intentional violation of Title
IX); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Title IX regulations governing employment in educational institu-
tions); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding implied private right
of action in statute).
20011
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apply to an entire institution merely because one of its students or
one of its departments received a small federal grant.51 Because
few athletic departments received federal funds directly, the num-
ber of Title IX investigations into claims alleging discrimination in
athletic programs dropped dramatically. 52 For example, Grove City
College did not receive any financial assistance, but it enrolled stu-
dents who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants from the
federal government.53 In effect, the Grove City College decision re-
moved nearly every university's athletic program from the scope of
Title IX.54
In 1987, Congress legislatively reversed the Grove City deci-
sion, through the adoption of the Civil Rights Restoration Act
("CRRA") .55 The CRRA expressly stated that Title IX applies to "all
of the operations" of an educational institution, "any part of which
is extended Federal financial assistance." 56 Thus, Congress favored
a broad interpretation of Title IX. Congress passed the CRRA to
reverse the program-specific approach of the Grove City decision, by
restoring the broad scope of coverage and to clarify the application
of Title IX.5 7 Although the CRRA did not mention athletics specifi-
cally, the record of the floor debate leaves little doubt that the en-
actment was at least partially aimed at creating a more level playing
field for female athletes. 58
In 1990, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") published the Title
IX Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Manual") in order to aid in Title
51. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 571-74 (discussing how Court agreed with De-
partment of Education's determination that students' receipt of Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants brought college within regulatory definition of recipient of
federal financial assistance). The Court then determined that the only program or
activity that received federal assistance was the college's financial aid program. See
id. at 575. In so holding, the Court rejected the institution-wide theory. See id. at
572-73.
52. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (discuss-
ing how Title IX cases dropped or curtailed).
53. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 571-74.
54. SeeJohnson, supra note 49, at 564 (discussing effects of Grove City decision
on university athletic departments).
55. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
57. SeeJohnson, supra note 49, at 564-65 (noting congressional findings that
recent decisions and opinions have narrowed previously broad application of Title
IX). Congress also found that legislative action was necessary in order to restore
the prior interpretation of a broad, institution-wide application of the law. See id.
58. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 (noting that Congressional Record included
statements made by Senators Bryd, Hatch and Riegle decrying past discrimination
against female athletes and discussing importance of Title IX to ensure develop-
ment of athletic programs for women).
[Vol. 8: p. 189
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IX investigations of collegiate athletic programs. 59 The Manual
outlines general areas of compliance, scholarships, other athletic
benefits and opportunities and effective accommodation of stu-
dents, all of which were mentioned in the 1979 Policy Interpreta-
tion.60 Because it details the procedures that OCR personnel
should follow in investigating an athletic program, the Manual has
considerable practical significance. 61
In conclusion, the broad language of Title IX has created nu-
merous difficulties concerning its interpretation and enforcement.
However, the 1975 regulations, the 1979 Policy Interpretation, the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, and the 1990 Investigator's
Manual have all helped to create a better understanding of Title IX.
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
The potential for litigation under Title IX increased substan-
tially as a result of two Supreme Court holdings.62 These cases al-
low Title IX to be enforced through court action, with the potential
for monetary relief in addition to equitable or injunctive relief, if
such relief is still available at the time the case is adjudicated. In
1979 the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago6&3
that Title IX contained an implied private right of action for ag-
grieved parties.64 Furthermore, in 1992, the Court held in Franklin
59. See generally VALEIuE M. BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, TITLE IX ATHLETICS
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990) (providing guidelines and assistance for OCR in-
vestigators assessing compliance with Title IX). The manual updates and super-
sedes the guidance developed by the OCR for its investigators in the INTERIM TITLE
IX INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS MANUAL, issued July 28, 1980, and the memoran-
dum entitled, "Guidance for Writing Title IX Intercollegiate Athletics Letters of Findings,"
issued March 26, 1982. See id.
60. For a discussion of the 1979 Policy Interpretation and the areas of compli-
ance it outlines, see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
61. SeeJohnson, supra note 49, at 567 (noting significance of Manual in giving
concrete meaning to terminology of three part test). The Manual provides univer-
sities with some guidance as to how the OCR will evaluate the three prongs of the
test. See id. Regarding the first prong, the Manual suggests to investigators that
there is no set ratio that constitutes "substantially proportionate" or that, when not
met, results in a disparity or a violation. See id. The Manual provides the following
example: "if the enrollment is 52 percent male and 48 percent female, then, ide-
ally, about 52 percent of the participants in the athletics program should be male
and 48 percent female." Id. The Manual also provides guidance for the second
and third prongs of the test, by suggesting types of information that the OCR
should gather in order to determine whether an institution could meet the re-
quirements set forth in the test. See id.
62. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
63. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
64. See id. at 717.
2001]
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v. Gwinnett County Public Schools6 5 that an individual had a right to
bring a private action for damages against an educational institu-
tion. 66 The Gwinnett Court also held that a plaintiff could recover
monetary damages for intentional violations of Title IX.67 The
combination of these two decisions has opened the floodgates for
Title IX litigation, resulting in a sharp increase in gender-based ath-
letic discrimination complaints against universities.
C. Recent Title IX Caselaw: Women Athletes are Successful in
Title IX Legal Battles
Recently, federal courts have examined Title IX and its ability
to provide potential plaintiffs and university athletic departments
with enforcement guidelines. These recent decisions have granted
new opportunities to women who have the skill and desire to com-
pete in collegiate athletics. The following cases illustrate the diffi-
culties that universities encounter when faced with athletic
budgetary constraints. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate how
courts consistently analyze these disputes under the Policy Interpre-
tation's three-prong test.
1. Cohen v. Brown University ("Cohen I")
In 1993, the First Circuit decided the most detailed case to date
regarding Title IX compliance, Cohen v. Brown University ("Cohen
1").68 In Cohen I, female student-athletes brought a class action suit
under Title IX against Brown University.69 The student-athletes
were members of the women's gymnastics team and women's volley-
ball team, both of which were "demoted from full varsity status to
intercollegiate club status" when the University implemented cut-
backs in the athletic department as "a belt-tightening measure."70
In 1991, Brown University declared that due to financial diffi-
culties, it planned to eliminate four sports teams from its intercolle-
giate varsity athletic program. 7' The University allowed each of
65. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
66. See id. at 76-77 (noting that sexual abuse and harassment of female stu-
dent by teacher had sufficient damaging effects as to compel Court to provide
remedy).
67. See id.
68. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
69. See id. at 888.
70. Id. at 891 (noting that named parties also included President and Athletic
Director of University).
71. See id. at 892 (noting that teams to be eliminated included women's volley-
ball and gymnastics as well as men's golf and water polo).
[Vol. 8: p. 189
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these teams to continue playing but demoted them to "intercollegi-
ate club" status. 72 This permitted the teams to continue to compete
against other collegiate athletic teams, but it revoked all financial
support and services that they had received previously from the
University. 73
The plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of "all present
and future Brown University women students and potential stu-
dents who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred
from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown. '74
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, which ordered
the University to reinstate the women's athletic teams that were de-
moted from full varsity status while the plaintiffs' Title IX claim was
pending. 75 From this decision, the University appealed. 76
The plaintiffs argued that the University's elimination of these
athletic teams violated Title IX's ban on gender discrimination. 77
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that this violation "was allegedly
exacerbated by Brown's decision to devalue the two women's pro-
grams without first making sufficient reductions in men's activities
or, in the alternative, adding other women's teams to compensate
for the loss."78 Therefore, the pivotal issue in the case was whether
Brown had accommodated effectively the interests and abilities of
the student body.79
72. Id.
73. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892 (noting that services included "salaried
coaches, access to prime facilities, preferred practice time, medical trainers, cleri-
cal assistance, office support, and admission preferences.... ."). "Brown estimated
that eliminating these four varsity teams would save $77,813 per annum, broken
down as follows: women's volleyball, $37,127; women's gymnastics, $24,901; men's
water polo, $9250; men's golf, $6545." Id.
74. Id. at 893.
75. See id. at 891 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I.
1992)).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 892-93 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60
(1992)) (recognizing implied private right of action under Title IX); Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies was not prerequisite to Title IX suit).
78. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892-93 (noting that elimination of these four sports
decreased women's budget significantly while men's budget decreased minimally).
The Cohen I court noted that the elimination of the athletic teams took signifi-
cantly more money from the women's budget than from the men's budget, al-
though it "did not materially effect the athletic opportunity ratios." Id. The court
also noted that at the time, Brown's student body was approximately 52% male and
48% female, while Brown's varsity athletic roster was 63.3% male and only 36.7%
female. See id. at 892.
79. See id. at 892, 897 (discussing how effective accommodation of student
interests and abilities was pivotal issue because of statistical discrepancies).
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The court looked to the Policy Interpretation's three-prong
test to assess the issue of whether the University had provided an
effective accommodation.8 0 The first prong, the substantial propor-
tionality test, provides "a safe harbor for those institutions that have
provided athletic opportunities in numbers 'substantially propor-
tionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies."81 Re-
garding this prong, the First Circuit affirmed the holding of the
district court, stating that Brown University failed to meet the sub-
stantial proportionality test because it did not offer enough varsity
athletic opportunities for women students.82
If a university cannot meet the first prong of the Policy Inter-
pretation test, it may satisfy the second prong by showing that in
order to meet the needs of the underrepresented gender, there is
"a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities" of
the underrepresented gender.83 The First Circuit again affirmed
the district court's decision, holding that although Brown could
show that its women's athletic programs had developed significantly
in the 1970s, the University had not continued this development
over the next two decades. 84 Therefore, the First Circuit concluded
that the University's athletic program also failed to meet the second
prong.85
Having determined that the University did not meet the first
two prongs required under the Policy Interpretation, the court
looked to the third prong, the full and effective accommodation
test.8 6 This test is met by "ensuring participatory opportunities at
80. See id. at 897. For further discussion of the Policy Interpretation's effec-
tive accommodation test, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
81. Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 897-98 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418) (noting that
university may stay in compliance with Title IX by "maintaining gender parity be-
tween its student body and its athletic line up.").
82. See id. at 903 (noting that university did not challenge finding due to
strength of statistical evidence).
83. Id. at 898 (noting that second prong is met as long as university can prove
that "an ongoing effort is made to meet the needs of the under-represented [sic]
gender.").
84. See id. at 903 (noting that University's actions fell short of necessary level
of program expansion). The First Circuit noted that while "a university deserves
appreciable applause for supercharging a low-voltage athletic program in one
burst rather than powering it up over a longer period, such energization, once
undertaken, does not forever hold the institution harmless." Id.
85. See id. at 903.
86. See Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 903 (mentioning effects of University's not meet-
ing either of first two prongs of accommodation test). "Even when male athletic
opportunities outnumber female athletic opportunities, and the university has not
met the first benchmark (substantial statistical proportionality) or the second
benchmark (continuing program expansion) of the accommodation test, the mere
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the intercollegiate level when, and to the extent that, there is 'suffi-
cient interest and ability among the members of the excluded sex
to sustain a viable team and a reasonable expectation of intercolle-
giate competition for that team .. ' "87 The First Circuit found
that Brown University failed to meet the third prong because it was
not fully and effectively accommodating the women's athletic pro-
grams.88 Due to Brown University's failure to meet the three-prong
test, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary in-
junction, which reinstated the women's volleyball and gymnastics
teams.8
9
2. Cohen v. Brown University ("Cohen II")
In 1996, the First Circuit reexamined these issues in Cohen v.
Brown University ("Cohen II").9o The Cohen II court also rejected
Brown University's argument that "an athletics program equally ac-
commodates both genders and complies with Title IX if it accom-
modates the relative interests of its male and female students."91
Essentially, the University argued that because males are more in-
terested in athletics, Title IX compliance could be obtained even if
females held fewer athletic roster spots as long as the University's
action was directly proportionate to the comparative levels of inter-
est.9 2 The Cohen H court declared that the University's "relative in-
terests approach" was invalid because it "disadvantage [d] women
and undermine[d] the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting
required program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the
status quo level of relative interests. '93
The First Circuit's analysis in both Cohen I and Cohen H has de-
fined the standards for Title IX compliance in the 1990s, and it has
fact that there are some female students interested in a sport does not ipso facto
require the school to automatically provide a varsity team in order to comply with
the third benchmark." Id. at 898 (noting that accommodation test is "high, but
not absolute").
87. Id. at 898 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418) (noting that University must
continue development until opportunities are "equivalent by gender").
88. See id. at 904 (noting that there was "great interest and talent among the
school's female student-athletes," which would not be utilized if these teams were
eliminated). Specifically, the court noted that there was interest and talent suffi-
cient to support varsity teams in women's volleyball and women's gymnastics, and
with the elimination of these teams, the talent would be wasted. See id.
89. See id. at 907 (noting that preliminary injunction was "well within the en-
cincture of judicial discretion.").
90. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 174.
92. See id.
93. Id. (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 209 (D.R.I. 1995)).
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eliminated the confusion surrounding the effective accommoda-
tion test.
3. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania
In Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania ("IUP"),94 mem-
bers of the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams filed suit
"alleging that the University discriminated based on gender when
cutting athletic programs, in violation of Title IX. ' '9 5 The Third
Circuit upheld the district court's finding that IUP had failed to
meet the effective accommodation standard.96 The court applied
the three prong test and reasoned that IUP did not meet the first
prong, substantial proportionality, because a significant disparity
existed between the number of female students and the number of
female athletes.97 The court found that due to the recent decrease
in the number of women's athletic teams at IUP, the second prong,
continuing expansion, had also not been met.98 Finally, the court
held that IUP failed to meet the third prong, the full and effective
accommodation test, because evidence that there was significant in-
terest and talent to support the athletic teams that had been elimi-
nated.99 The Favia court further held that, although two men's
teams were cut in order to maintain equality, that fact did not trans-
late into equal opportunity for both sexes. 10 0
94. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
95. Favia, 7 F.3d. at 332 (noting that IUP planned to "replace the women's
gymnastics program with a women's soccer program ... [in order to] bring it
closer to compliance with Title IX.").
96. See id. at 342-44.
97. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85 (discussing court's agreement with plain-
tiffs' contention that University "failed to provide women students with opportuni-
ties to participate in Intercollegiate Athletics proportionate to the percentage of
women in the undergraduate student body."). The court noted that elimination of
the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams reduced the number of female
student-athletes to 36.51 percent. See id.
98. See id. at 585 (stating that defendants "failed to override the proportional-
ity requirement by not showing a history of expanding its athletic opportunities to
respond to developing interest of women students."). The court noted that "the
levels of opportunities for women to compete went from low to lower, and the
1991 cuts were not responsive to the needs, interests and abilities of ... women
students." Id. This discrepancy was rooted in the fact that for every $8.00 spent on
men's athletic programs, only $2.75 was spent on women's programs. See id.
99. See id. (discussing court's belief that IUP had not fully and effectively ac-
commodated interests and abilities of women athletes).
100. See id. at 582 (holding that equality in team numbers was not parallel to
equality in number of opportunities for underrepresented sex).
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4. Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture
In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,10l members of
women's varsity fast-pitch softball team filed suit "challenging [the]
university's discontinuation of the program." 10 2 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that Colorado State University
("CSU") failed to meet the requirements of any of the three prongs
of the Policy Interpretation. 10 3 The first prong, substantial propor-
tionality, was not met because there was "a 10.5% disparity between
female athletic participation and female undergraduate enroll-
ment."1 0 4 The second prong, continuing expansion, was not met
because opportunities for women athletes at CSU had decreased
over the last ten years. 10 5 Finally, the third prong, the full and ef-
fective accommodation test, was not met because the softball team
was competitive and healthy at the time that CSU terminated its
varsity status.106
D. Reverse Discrimination: Men's Claims Under Title IX are
Currently Unsuccessful
Recently, many colleges and universities have been forced to
cut athletic funding due to serious budgetary constraints. 10 7 While
many schools wish to comply with Title IX standards by expanding
opportunities for women athletes, most cannot afford to do so. As
a direct result of Cohen I and similar cases, many schools are now
choosing to cut back on or eliminate men's sports programs while
retaining most, if not all, of women's sports programs.' 08 Conse-
101. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1994 (1993).
102. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 824 (noting that CSU eliminated men's varsity base-
ball team in addition to women's varsity softball team).
103. See id. at 831-32 (noting that Tenth Circuit upheld district court's grant
of permanent injunction ordering school to reinstate women's softball team).
104. Id. at 830 (noting that plaintiffs met their burden of showing that defen-
dant did not meet substantial proportionality based on disparity between athletic
participation of women and women's representation in student body).
105. See id. (noting that although CSU added eleven sports for women during
1970s, women's participation opportunities decreased steadily during 1980s). The
court noted that the facts "can logically support no other conclusion that that...
CSU has not maintained a practice of program expansion in women's athlet-
ics .... ." Id.
106. See id. at 831 (stating that CSU could not prove athletic program had
"fully and effectively accommodated interests and abilities of women athletes.").
107. See generally Charles P. Beveridge, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When
Schools Cut Men's Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 809 (1996).
108. See id. at 810-11 (noting that some schools continue to expand women's
programs).
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quently, many non-revenue men's sports teams have been demoted
to club status or eliminated entirely. 109
1. Kelley v. Board of Trustees
In 1993, the University of Illinois eliminated four varsity ath-
letic programs. 110 The University's decision to eliminate these pro-
grams was "motivated by budget considerations . . . including the
need to comply with Title IX." 111 In Kelley v. Board of Trustees,112
members of the men's swimming team filed suit alleging that the
University's actions violated Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 13
Plaintiffs argued that the regulation and the Policy Interpreta-
tion distorted Title IX, and "through some alchemy of bureaucratic
regulation... transformed... a statute which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex into a statute that mandates discrimination
against males." 1 4 The court dismissed this argument, finding that
neither the regulation nor the Policy Interpretation were contrary
to the purposes of Title IX.115
Plaintiffs also asserted that the substantial proportionality test,
as defined in the Policy Interpretation, established a gender-based
quota system that was contrary to the purpose of Title IX.116 The
court dismissed this argument, and it held instead that the Policy
Interpretation created a reasonable approach to measure compli-
109. See id. (noting that these teams include but are not limited to men's
swimming, wrestling, soccer and gymnastics).
110. See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing these
eliminated sports as men's swimming and fencing and men's and women's diving).
111. Id. at 269 (discussing reasons why men's swimming was eliminated). The
University chose to maintain the women's swimming program "because such ac-
tion would put the University at risk of violating Title IX." Id. (noting that number
of female athletes was considerably lower than number of females attending
University).
112. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
113. See id. at 267.
114. Id. at 270 (noting that applicable regulation was 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 and
Policy Interpretation was 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418).
115. See id. (detailing court's rejection of plaintiffs' contention that regulation
and Policy Interpretation opposed purpose of Title IX).
116. See id. at 271 (rejecting plaintiffs' suggestion that Policy Interpretation
requires "statistical balancing"). The court found that the Policy Interpretation
"merely creates a presumption that a school is in compliance with Title IX and the
applicable regulation when it achieves such a statistical balance." Id. A university
may still prove that it is Title IX compliant by showing that it has a history of
program expansion for the underrepresented sex, or that the interests of the un-
derrepresented sex are effectively accommodated by the existing programs, even if
it has not met the substantial proportionality prong of the test. See id.
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ance with Title IX. 117 The Kelley court concluded that the school's
actions were consistent with the statute, and neither the regulation
nor the Policy Interpretation violated Title IX.118 Finally, the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they were de-
nied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 19
III. ANALYsis
Recently, both the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits have re-
viewed decisions addressing issues of reverse discrimination under
Title IX. In Boulahanis v. Board of Regents,120 the Seventh Circuit
examined this issue when student-athletes at a state university chal-
lenged the elimination of the men's soccer and wrestling programs
as a violation of Title IX.121 The Ninth Circuit also reviewed this
issue recently in Neal v. Board of Trustees,122 where student-athletes
also brought suit against a state university, alleging that the reduc-
tion of the number of roster spots on its men's wrestling team vio-
lated Title IX.123 Both courts concluded that the Universities'
actions did not constitute Title IX violations.124 Decisions such as
these set the precedent for analysis of reverse discrimination claims
under Title IX.
A. Recent Decisions
1. Boulahanis v. Board of Regents
a. Facts and Background
In 1993, Illinois State University commenced an investigation
of gender equity and Title IX compliance, and it ultimately con-
cluded that the opportunities available to women were unequal to
117. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271.
118. See id. at 271-72 (noting that to require parallel teams would ensure
equal opportunity to both sexes). Had this proposal been adopted, the men's
swimming program would not have been eliminated. See id. at 271. However, the
court noted that requiring parallel teams would deny "schools the flexibility to
respond to the differing athletic interests of men and women." Id. (noting conse-
quence that University would have to eliminate football program or start women's
program regardless of whether interest was expressed by women students).
119. See id. (noting that equal protection claim stemmed from University's
decision to eliminate men's swimming team while deciding to maintain women's
swimming team).
120. 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
121. See id. at 634-35 (noting that plaintiffs included past and future members
of men's soccer and wrestling teams).
122. 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
123. See id. at 765-66.
124. For further discussion of courts' analyses in these cases, see infra notes
128-41, 152-76 and accompanying text.
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the opportunities available to men.1 25 Consequently, the University
reviewed alternatives that would allow them to obtain Title IX com-
pliance.1 26 The University considered the three options set forth by
the Policy Interpretation of Title IX: "(1) provide participation op-
portunities for men and women that are substantially proportionate
to their respective rates of enrollment as full-time undergraduate
students; or (2) demonstrate a history and continuing practice of
program expansion for the under-represented [sic] sex; or (3) fully
and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the
under-represented [sic] sex."1 27
The University concluded that "substantial proportionality"
was the best way to achieve Title IX compliance, due to the fact that
the University had not added a women's sports team to its program
in the last decade and due to the difficulty of accommodating effec-
tively the interests and abilities of the female students. 128 Ten op-
tions that would allow the University to obtain Title IX compliance
were considered, and it was determined that the best course of ac-
tion was to eliminate the men's soccer and men's wrestling pro-
grams, while adding a women's soccer program.129
In Boulahanis, the plaintiffs were former and prospective mem-
bers of the men's soccer and men's wrestling teams at Illinois State
125. See Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 635 (7th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that study specified that University enrollment was forty-five percent male and
fifty-five percent female, although participation in athletics was sixty-six percent
male and thirty-four percent female).
126. See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) to assert that university must "provide
equal athletic opportunity").
127. Id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)). For further discussion of the
Policy Interpretation, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
128. See id. (mentioning that University's motivation for compliance was 1995
audit by NCAA that noted violations of Title IX requirements).
129. See id. at 635-36 (citing other options considered to achieve Title IX com-
pliance). These options included:
(1) dropping men's wrestling; (2) dropping men's wrestling and men's
soccer; (3) dropping men's wrestling, men's soccer, and men's tennis; (4)
dropping men's wrestling and adding women's soccer; (5) dropping
men's wrestling and men's soccer and adding women's soccer; (6) drop-
ping men's wrestling, men's soccer, and men's tennis, and adding wo-
men's soccer; (7) adding women's soccer; (8) adding women's soccer
and bringing women to full funding; (9) dropping men's wrestling and
men's soccer, adding women's soccer, and adjusting men's rosters and
women's grants in aid; and (10) dropping men's wrestling and men's soc-
cer, adding women's soccer, and adjusting men's rosters and grants in aid
for both men and women.
Id.
The option chosen ultimately "increased the athletic participation of women
to 51.72% and decreased the participation of men to 48.29%, thereby bringing the
disparity between enrollment and participation to within three percentage points."
Id. at 636.
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University, who were not able to participate in athletics at the Uni-
versity because their programs were eliminated under the gender
equity plan. 130 The plaintiffs alleged a Title IX violation, as well as
various violations of their constitutional rights under § 1983 and
§ 1985(3).131 After the district court granted summary judgment to
the University on the Title IX claim and dismissed the constitu-
tional claims, the plaintiffs appealed.132
b. Seventh Circuit Analysis
The Boulahanis court first considered the plaintiff-appellants'
("appellants") contention that "the University's actions in eliminat-
ing the men's soccer and men's wrestling programs were based
solely on the sex of the participants." 33 This argument was compa-
rable to an issue that the Seventh Circuit previously examined in
Kelley v. Board of Trustees,13 4 where it held that the elimination of the
men's swimming program was not in violation of Title IX because
"men's participation in athletics [continued] to be more than sub-
stantially proportionate to their presence in [the University of Illi-
nois's] student body." 135
The Seventh Circuit rejected the appellants' argument that the
Kelley decision was not controlling because it was distinguishable
from the situation at issue. 136 In effect, the appellants attempted to
show a difference between "decisions in which sex is a considera-
tion (as in Kelley) and decisions in which sex serves as the motivat-
130. See Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 634-35 (noting plaintiffs' contention that Uni-
versity's decision to eliminate athletic programs was based on sex).
131. See id. at 635 (discussing violations alleged by plaintiffs). This Comment
will focus on plaintiffs' contentions under Title IX and will not address the viola-
tions of constitutional fights under § 1983 and § 1985(3).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 636 (noting contention that elimination of teams violated Title IX
because discriminatory actions would not have occurred "but for" sex of appel-
lants). The Boulahanis court noted that the test to determine whether discrimina-
tion has occurred was if the evidence provided that the treatment of a person
would have been different but for that person's sex. See id. (citing Int'l Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991)) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)) (citations omitted).
134. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
135. Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 637 (citing Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270) (noting that
elimination of men's swimming team in Kelley occurred because of University's
attempt to reduce athletic budget). Members of the men's swimming team argued
that the University's actions constituted a violation of Title IX due to the fact that
while the men's team was eliminated, the women's team was maintained. See Bou-
lahanis, 198 F.3d at 637 (citing Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269-70).
136. See Boulahanis, 198 F.3d 636 (noting appellants' argument to distinguish
Kelley was based on University's motivations in elimination of athletic teams).
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ing factor (as in the present case) ."137 The Boulahanis court was not
persuaded by this argument, and noted that it ignored "the fact
that a university's decision as to which athletic programs to offer
necessarily entails budgetary considerations." 138 Furthermore, the
court noted substantial difficulties when analyzing this argument
"against the backdrop of the multiple concerns at work in a univer-
sity's decision to eliminate an athletic program."1 39
The Seventh Circuit looked to its decision in Kelley, where it
was determined that the Policy Interpretations were "a reasonable
exercise of the Office of Civil Rights' congressionally delegated dis-
cretion to interpret the law."140 The Policy Interpretations provide
that universities may show Title IX compliance by proving that the
"participation of the under-represented [sic] sex is substantially
proportionate to their enrollment at the university."141 Therefore,
"holding that universities cannot achieve substantial proportionality
by cutting men's programs" is essentially "a requirement that uni-
versities achieve substantial proportionality through additional
spending to add women's sports programs."1 42 The Boulahanis
court suggested that this result would overlook the monetary re-
strictions with which universities often are faced.143
137. Id. (discussing appellants' contention that decision in this case did not
violate Title IX because it was based on financial considerations).
138. Id. at 637 (elaborating on appellants' attempt to distinguish decisions to
eliminate athletic programs motivated by financial concerns from those based on
considerations of sex). "For universities, decisions about cutting or adding athletic
programs are based on a consideration of many factors including: the total size of
the athletic department, which is governed by budgetary considerations, and the
distribution of programs among men and women, which is governed by Title IX
concerns." Id. The Seventh Circuit found that it was difficult to distinguish two
issues so closely entwined. See id. The court further noted that "both the decision
of the University in this case and the decision of the University of Illinois in Kelley
were based on a combination of financial and sex-based concerns that are not
easily distinguished." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 637-38 (citing Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270-71) (holding that Policy Inter-
pretation must be given deference because it is "neither arbitrary or capricious")
(citing Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)); see also Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d
888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993)) (stating that "[t]he degree of deference [given to agency
interpretations] is particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly
delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs
under Title IX.").
141. Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418).
142. Id.
143. See id. (citing Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th
Cir. 1993)) ("[I]n times of economic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy
Title IX's effective accommodation requirement by continuing to expand their
women's athletic programs.").
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Therefore, the court relied on its holding in Kelley that there is
not a violation of Title IX because men's athletic programs are
eliminated, assuming that "men's participation in athletics contin-
ues to be 'substantially proportionate' to their enrollment."144 The
Boulahanis court held that because Illinois State University had
maintained substantial proportionality between the number of men
enrolled at the University and the number of men that participated
in the athletic programs, it had provided a successful accommoda-
tion. 145 The court ultimately concluded that the actions of Illinois
State University did not rise to the level of a Tide IX violation. 146
2. Neal v. Board of Trustees
a. Facts and Background
In the 1996 academic year, female students substantially out-
numbered male students at California State University, Bakersfield
("CSUB"). 14 7 Within the arena of varsity athletics, however, male
students held sixty-one percent of positions on the University's ath-
letic teams and received sixty-eight percent of the funds available
for athletic scholarships. 148 Subsequently, the California chapter of
the National Organization for Women ("NOW") filed a lawsuit
which resulted in a consent decree mandating "that each Cal. State
campus have a proportion of female athletes that was within five
percentage points of the proportion of female undergraduate stu-
dents at the school.' 49 In order to comply with the consent de-
cree, CSUB chose to decrease the size of all men's athletic teams. 50
144. Id. (citing Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270) (noting that substantial proportionality
was met here because athletic participation of men at University remained within
three percentage points of enrollment after elimination of men's soccer and men's
wrestling).
145. See id. at 639 (noting presumption of successful accommodation when
because university achieves substantial proportionality); see also Kelley, 35 F.3d at
271; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829 ("'[S]ubstantial proportionality' between athletic par-
ticipation and undergraduate enrollment provides a safe harbor for recipients
under Title IX."); Cohen, 991 F.2d 888, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[A] university
which does not wish to engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay on the
sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student
body and its athletic lineup.").
146. See Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 641.
147. See Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
female students made up sixty-four percent of population and male students made
up thirty-six percent at CSUB).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 765 (noting that lawsuit alleged violation of state law comparable to
Title IX).
150. See id. (noting that University did not support idea of eliminating some
men's teams entirely). CSUB agreed to the reduction in number of roster spots at
a time when state funding for higher education was decreasing. See id. The
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As a result of the reduction in the number of roster spots avail-
able to each athletic team, the number of participants on the men's
wrestling team was initially restricted to twenty-seven.15 1 From 1996
to 1997, the number of participants was restricted to twenty-five,
and although four of these spots were not filled, the wrestling team
filed suit.152 The plaintiffs alleged that "the University's policy of
capping the size of the men's team constituted discrimination on
the basis of gender in violation of Tide IX and of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Federal Constitution."1 5 3 In order to prohibit
the University from reducing further the size of the men's wrestling
team, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. 154 The
district court held "that CSUB's primary motivation for capping the
size of the men's teams was to meet the gender proportionality re-
quirements of the consent decree," and that this violated Title
IX.15 5 The defendants appealed the district court's grant of the
preliminary injunction. 156
b. Ninth Circuit Analysis
The Neal court first considered the appellees' contention that
"gender-conscious remedies are appropriate only when necessary to
ensure that schools provide opportunities to males and females in
proportion to their relative interest in sports participation." 157 The
amounts the University had to spend on its athletic programs was restricted. See id.
Therefore, the University decided to "adopt squad size targets, which would en-
courage the expansion of women's teams, while limiting the size of men's teams."
Id. Ideally, the plan would bring the University into compliance by the start of the
1997-1998 school year. See id. Ultimately, the goal was to have fifty-five percent of
roster spots filled by female students. See id.
151. See id. at 765-66 (noting that Coach Terry Kerr and team Captain Ste-
phen Neal protested reduction at its onset). While Neal argued that a smaller
squad would not be as competitive, the team finished third in the nation in 1996.
See id.
152. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 766 (noting that suit was filed due to rumor that
men's team would be eliminated completely).
153. Id. at 766. This Comment will focus on olaintiffs' contentions under Ti-
tie IX and will not address specifically the violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
154. See id.
155. Id. (noting further that court refused to rule on plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion challenge and rejected argument that Title IX provided "safe harbor" for
schools achieving substantial proportionality between "percentage of athletes of
one gender and percentage of students of that same gender."). The court con-
cluded that the "safe harbor" argument as presented under Title IX would be
problematic in relation to the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
156. See id. at 765.
157. Neal, 198 F.3d at 767 (noting, in opposition, appellants' argument that
gender-conscious decisions concerning funding given to athletic teams are allowed
to balance number of students with number of student-athletes). The Neal court
noted the importance of this discrepancy in that men are generally more inter-
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appellees looked to the three-prong test set forth in the Policy In-
terpretation and attacked the first prong of the test, which states
that a university is in compliance with Title IX if "participation
levels for each gender are 'substantially proportionate' to their rep-
resentation in the student body."15 8 The Ninth Circuit relied on
the First Circuit case, Cohen v. Brown University,159 which held that a
university could not argue Tide IX compliance when it provided
females with fewer athletic roster spots, even if the school's action
was in response to males having a higher level of interest.1 60 Ulti-
mately, the Ninth Circuit rejected this approach because it was not
consistent with the purpose of Tide IX.161 The Neal court sug-
gested that this interpretation would allow universities to do almost
nothing to equalize opportunities for men and women if they could
prove that women were less interested in participating in the Uni-
versity's athletic programs. 162 Furthermore, the court noted that
because the ultimate purpose of Tide IX was to encourage women
ested in participating in varsity sports than are women. See id. Therefore, allowing
"gender-conscious remedies until the proportions of students and athletes are
roughly proportional gives universities with more remedial freedom than permit-
ting remedies only until expressed interest and varsity roster spots correspond."
Id.
158. Id. at 767-68 (noting Cohen I court's view of Title IX compliance under
three-prong test); see also id. at 769 (citing Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp.
892 (M.D. La. 1996)) (criticizing first prong of Policy Interpretation test). For
further discussion of the Policy Interpretation of 1979, see supra notes 37-44 and
accompanying text.
159. 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen ').
160. See Nea 198 F.3d at 768 (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899). The Neal court
also noted the Cohen II court's statement that "Brown's relative interests approach
cannot withstand scrutiny on either legal or policy grounds, because it disadvan-
tages women and undermines the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting re-
quired program expansion for the under-represented [sic] sex to the status quo
level of relative interests." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996)
("Cohen IF).
161. Nea4 198 F.3d at 768.
162. See id. (noting that to comply with first prong of test, university must
provide opportunities proportionate to gender composition of the student body,
not proportionate to amount of interest expressed by each sex); see also Favia v.
Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting violation of Title IX
when University had student body that was fifty-six percent female and athletic
teams that were forty-three percent female). The Ninth Circuit noted the Cohen I
court's clear rejection of the "interest" test. See Neal, 198 F.3d 768. "The reason for
Cohen Ps 'interest' test was clear enough: 'Given that the survey of interests and
abilities would begin under circumstances where men's athletic teams have a con-
siderable head start, such a rule would almost certainly blunt the exhortation that
schools should 'take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's inter-
ests and abilities' and avoid 'disadvantag[ing] members of an underrepresented
sex .... '" Neal, 198 F.3d 768 (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg.
at 71,417)).
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to participate in sports, the demand for the number of roster spots
and scholarships reserved for women would eventually increase. 163
The Neal court next considered whether, under Title IX, a uni-
versity is allowed to reduce the athletic opportunities available to
men in order to align them with the lesser athletic opportunities
available to women. 164 The Ninth Circuit noted that every court
that has reviewed the Policy Interpretation and Title IX has deter-
mined that compliance may be achieved by increasing the opportu-
nities available for the underrepresented gender or by decreasing
the opportunities for the overrepresented gender.1 65 The court
concluded that "if a university wishes to comply with Title IX by
leveling down programs instead of ratcheting them up ... Tide IX
is not offended."1 66
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of injunc-
tive relief because the district court did not apply the interpretation
163. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 768 (noting that Title IX's purpose was to encourage
females' interest and participation in athletics); see also id. at 768-69 (citing Cohen
II, 101 F.3d at 178-79) (noting that if Title IX allowed universities to provide fewer
athletic opportunities for women because women are stereotypically less interested
in sports than men are, it would ignore purpose of eliminating discrimination
from stereotyped notions of women's interests); Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that while some actions may appear
gender-neutral, they are actually perpetuating gender-based discrimination).
164. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 769-70 (noting that other courts of appeals have
addressed this issue); see also Homer, 43 F.3d at 275; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d
265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830
(10th Cir. 1993) ("We recognize that in times of economic hardship, few schools
will be able to satisfy Tide IX's effective accommodation requirement by continu-
ing to expand their women's athletics programs .... Financially strapped institu-
tions may still comply with Title IX by cutting athletic programs such that men's
and women's athletic participation rates become substantially proportionate to
their representation in the undergraduate population."); Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898
n.15 (holding, "Title IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing sums
into its athletic establishment. If a university prefers to take another route, it can
also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the accommodation
test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities for the
over-represented gender while keeping opportunities stable for the under-repre-
sented [sic] gender.").
165. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 769-70. "[B]oosters of male sports argued vocifer-
ously before Congress that the proposed regulations would require schools to shift
resources from men's programs to women's programs, but that Congress neverthe-
less sided 'with women's advocates' by deciding not to repeal the HEW's athletic-
related Title IX regulations." Id. at 770 (citing MaryJo Festle, PLAYING NICE: POLIT-
ICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN'S SPORTS, 171-76 (1996)) (noting that Title IX's legis-
lative history and regulations were enacted to apply its provisions to college
athletics). The Neal court suggested that congressional intent was that "Title IX
would result in funding restrictions to male athletic programs." Id.
166. Id. at 770.
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of Title IX as presented by the Department of Education. 167 The
Neal court looked to the plain meaning of the language set forth in
the non-discrimination principle 68 and held that it did "not bar
remedial actions designed to achieve substantial proportionality be-
tween athletic rosters and student bodies.' 69 The court noted, fur-
thermore, that the Seventh Circuit had rejected expressly the
appellees' interpretation. 70 The Ninth Circuit determined that
the OCR's interpretation of Title IX's athletic provisions should be
given deference under the previous decisions.1 71 Therefore, a uni-
versity where male athletes are overrepresented can achieve Tide
IX compliance "by reducing sufficiently the number of roster spots
available to men."172
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's rejection
of the OCR's interpretation of Tide IX.173 The First and Seventh
Circuits had addressed previously the issue of "the constitutionality
of the first prong of the OCR test."174 In Cohen I, Cohen II and Kel-
ley, the claim that the Policy Interpretation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment was rejected and, conversely, it was held that the "con-
stitutional analysis contained therein persuasively dispose [d] of any
serious constitutional concerns that might be raised in relation to
167. See id. (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993))
("Cohen r) (noting that Department of Education is administrative agency that
administers Tide IX). Congress has specifically ordered that the development of
standards for athletic programs under Title IX be handled by this administrative
agency. See id. (citing Pub.L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974)); see also Kelley,
35 F.3d at 269 n.3; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895; Neal, 198 F.3d
at 770 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984)) (noting that Congress delegates agency power to interpret provisions of
statute by regulation).
168. See Neal 198 F.3d at 771 (reviewing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)).
169. See id. (noting appellees' argument that Chevron was not applicable be-
cause OCR's interpretation violated plain meaning of statute). The Neal court
held that "appellees' interpretation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)'s plain meaning would
render 1681(b) superfluous." Id.
170. See id. at 771-72 (noting that other circuits have rejected this in holding
that schools may reduce number of male roster spots in order to achieve Title IX
compliance).
171. See id. (citing Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 173 and Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270-71)
(noting that Cohen II and Kelley courts held that 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 deserved defer-
ence under Chevron and that OCR Policy Interpretation deserved deference under
Martin); Neal, 198 F.3d at 771 (citing Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578,
584 (W.D. Pa. 1992)) (holding that OCR's Policy Interpretation deserved great
deference under Chevron).
172. Neal, 198 F.3d at 771.
173. See id. (rejecting district court's construction and adopting reasoning of
Cohen I, Cohen II and Kelley).
174. Id. at 772.
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the OCR's Policy Interpretation." 75 The Ninth Circuit held, there-
fore, that district court's rejection of the OCR's interpretation of
Title IX was incorrect. 176
B. Current Decisions Are Furthering Congressional Intent
Although the effective accommodation test offers three alter-
natives to universities who are seeking to meet the requirements of
Title IX, in reality, the only realistic option is the alternative of sub-
stantial proportionality. 177 In the last decade, universities across
the nation have dealt with budgetary constraints in their athletic
departments. As a result, the majority of these universities are not
able to accommodate the interests of female athletes and are there-
fore in violation of Title IX.178 These problems have increased with
recent Title IX decisions, in which the courts are not willing "to
provide universities with other ways to maneuver around the effec-
tive accommodation test."' 79 Furthermore, the OCR's increasing
caution in determining Title IX compliance is also problematic. 180
The substantial proportionality prong is considered the only
realistic option under the effective accommodation test because the
other two prongs, continuing expansion and full accommodation,
are both extremely difficult to meet. The second prong, continu-
ing expansion, necessitates in most instances, spending more
money than would usually be spent on women's programs. 181
Therefore, it is difficult to meet this prong of the regulation be-
cause it requires additional expenditures by athletic departments
that already have little to spend.182 The third prong, full and effec-
tive accommodation, requires a university to develop women's ath-
175. Id.
176. See id. at 772-73.
177. See B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 1995 Wisc. L. REV. 647, 656 (1995) (noting that most practical way to
comply with OCR's definition of effective accommodation is substantially propor-
tionality test).
178. See Shook, supra note 4, at 806 (citing Andrew Blum, Athletics in the Court,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 31) (noting that "NCAA Gender Equity Committee
found more than half of national undergraduate composition is female, but that
women represent fewer than a third of available opportunities to play varsity
sports.").
179. Id. (citing Joan O'Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field: College Football in Utah
Slows Gender Equity's Forward Progress, SALT LAKE CITy TRIB., Sept. 4, 1994, at Al)
(stating that OCR is taking more active approach according to athletic officials).
180. See id. (noting "vigilance" of OCR in determining compliance).
181. See id. at 793-96, 806 (illustrating that excessive program expansion in
1970s followed by "ten year dry spell of limited (if any) expansion in women's
sports" will not meet standard).
182. See id. at 793-96 (finding this alternative to be problematic).
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letics programs to fulfill the interests and talents of female athletes
that have not been met.183 Realistically, universities cannot afford
compliance under this prong in a time where budgetary restrictions
are commonplace. 18
4
Both the Seventh and the Ninth circuits utilize the substantial
proportionality prong as the foundation of their analyses. 185 In
both Boulahanis and Neal, the universities concluded that the sub-
stantial proportionality prong was the only affordable option that
would bring them into compliance with Title IX.1 8 6 This option
has proven to be problematic for many non-revenue athletic teams,
such as soccer and wrestling. For example, in Boulahanis, the men's
soccer and wrestling teams were completely eliminated, and in Neal,
the number of roster spots on the men's wrestling team was re-
duced in an effort to comply with substantial proportionality. 187
Many universities have found that the only way to achieve substan-
tial proportionality is "subtraction and downgrading" of men's ath-
letic teams when they are incapable of funding women's teams.1 88
Current Title IX decisions such as Boulahanis and Neal, which
have upheld the substantial proportionality prong of the effective
accommodation test, are furthering the statute's congressional in-
tent.189 The substantial proportionality prong of the test stipulates
that if a university's "participation opportunities.., are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enroll-
ments," that the university will be presumed to be in compliance. 90
It is presumed that "the substantial proportionality test reflects Title
183. See Shook, supra note 4, at 793-96 (discussing expense of such program
expansions).
184. See id. (noting that budgetary restrictions are becoming "the norm rather
than the exception").
185. For a discussion of the Boulahanis and Neal courts' analyses, see supra
notes 120-76 and accompanying text.
186. See Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that Title IX compliance is obtained by university when participation of under-
represented gender is substantially proportionate to enrollment of that gender);
see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing that university
is found to be Title IX compliant "if participation levels for each gender are 'sub-
stantially proportionate' to its representation in the student body.").
187. See Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 633 (noting University's complete elimination
of specific men's programs); see also Neal, 198 F.3d at 763, 765 (detailing Univer-
sity's reduction of roster spots on men's wrestling team).
188. Shook, supra note 4, at 808 (noting that women's teams are maintained,
while men's teams are eliminated in order to comply with Title IX).
189. For a discussion of the substantial proportionality analysis as presented
by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, see supra notes 128-43, 151-76 and accompany-
ing text.
190. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415-18 & n.3 (1979).
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IX's wording that 'no person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in ... any education program or activity
receiving federal aid."' 191 The language of Title IX does not sug-
gest that programs will be compared to determine whether there is
compliance with the statute.' 9 2 Instead, the statute is worded in a
way which focuses on "the personal nature of Title IX compli-
ance."1 93 The substantial proportionality prong "implicitly em-
braces the constitutional ideal of equality" because it compares
participation to student body numbers by gender.19 4 If a univer-
sity's method of funding athletic programs for one gender is
equivalent to the percentage of that gender's membership in the
student body, it can be assumed that even if the university is not
able to meet the interests of all students, it has divided the athletic
funding that it can afford in an even manner. 95 "While discrimina-
tion in the choice of sports funded by the institution may exist, dis-
crimination on the basis of gender does not exist."196 Therefore,
decisions such as Boulahanis and Neal, which have upheld the sub-
stantial proportionality prong of the test, are furthering the con-
gressional intent of Title IX. The substantial proportionality prong
of the test is "no more than a starting place for Title IX compli-
ance," which emulates the purpose of Tide IX in an effort to create
equal opportunities in athletic programs for both males and
females.' 9 7
IV. IMPACT
"Title IX is a dynamic statute, not a static one. It envisions con-
tinuing progress toward the goal of equal opportunity for all ath-
letes [both men and women]. " 198 Furthermore, Title IX provides
that because society has conditioned women to expect "less than
their fair share of athletic opportunities, women's interests will not
191. Shook, supra note 4, at 798 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)).
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 798-99 (noting that it is discriminatory to extend benefit to
some citizens on basis of sex unless purpose is to serve important governmental
interest).
195. See id. at 799 (noting that "even" disbursements are equally dispersed in
terms of gender).
196. Shook, supra note 4, at 799.
197. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1995)).
198. Nea4 198 F.3d at 769 (discussing movement toward equal opportunity
under Tide IX).
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rise to a par with men's overnight."199 Since 1972 Title IX has been
the strength behind the continued growth in women's athletics.
The percentage of college athletes who are women increased from
fifteen percent in 1972 to thirty-seven percent in 1998.200 Further-
more, between 1978 and 1996, there was a net gain of 1658 wo-
men's sports programs throughout the country.20 1 During the
same period of time, however, there was a net gain of only seventy-
four sports programs on the men's side.
20 2
By providing many new opportunities, Title IX has developed
successfully women's interests in sports, as well as increased their
potential to become intercollegiate athletes.20 3 Nevertheless, these
increased opportunities for women should not come at the expense
of decreased opportunities for men.2 0 4 Recently, many colleges
and universities across the country have been forced to eliminate
non-revenue men's athletic programs in an effort to achieve com-
pliance with Title IX.205 Thus far, federal courts have refused to
find merit in reverse discrimination suits alleging Title IX viola-
tions.20 6 Therefore, men's non-revenue athletic teams at many col-
leges and universities are faced with the risk of having the number
of roster spots on their teams reduced or even having the teams
eliminated completely.20 7 Reduction and elimination of non-reve-
199. Id. (noting that women's interests will develop as increased opportuni-
ties arise).
200. See Bredthauer, supra note 1, at 1107 (1998) (discussing development
and current status of Title IX).
201. See Rick Mahoney, Gender Equity Report Shows Gains Made By Women, Bus.
FIRsT OF BurALo, June 30, 1997, at 4 (noting substantial increases in women's
sports programs).
202. See id. (comparing increases in women's programs to that of men's
programs).
203. See Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gen-
derRole Oppression, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1627, 1640-41 (1997) (noting that women are
taking advantage of opportunities created by Title IX).
204. SeeJoseph Filippone, Title IX in the Nineties, 15 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS.
561, 594-95 (1999) (noting decrease in opportunities for men in order to balance
increase of opportunities for women under Title IX).
205. See id. (noting that elimination of men's athletic programs is not answer
to Title IX compliance); see also Shook, supra note 4, at 814 (finding that universi-
ties eliminate men's programs in order to develop women's programs due to budg-
etary constraints).
206. See Shook, supra note 4, at 793-96, 814 (noting case law supporting con-
clusion that reverse discrimination claims are currently unsuccessful); see generally
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding reverse discrimination
claim unsuccessful); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999);
Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
207. See Boulahanis, 198 F.3d 634-35 (noting complete elimination of men's
soccer and men's wrestling programs); Nea4 198 F.3d 765-66 (citing reduction of
number of roster spots on men's wrestling team); see also Shook, supra note 4, at
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nue men's teams is rapidly becoming the standard, as athletic de-
partments are forced to downsize their programs in order to
achieve Title IX compliance under the effective accommodation
test.
2 0 8
Universities have argued under the "interest-based" theory,
suggesting that decisions concerning funding for athletic programs
that take gender into account may be made "to correct for an im-
balance between the composition of the undergraduate student
body and the composition of the undergraduate student athletic
participants pool."20 9 The adoption of the "interest-based" test for
Title IX compliance, as presented by the universities in both the
Cohen decisions and in Neal, would impede, and quite possibly de-
stroy the continuing development in women's participation and in-
terest in athletics that has stemmed from the enactment of Title
IX.210
In Cohen I, the First Circuit noted that "athletics offers an op-
portunity to [execute] leadership skills, learn teamwork, build self-
confidence, and perfect self-discipline" for collegiate students. 211
For both men and women, these "lessons learned on the playing
fields, are an invaluable means of attaining career and life successes
in and out of professional sports."212 It is essential that universities
realize that if the motivating factor behind collegiate sports is truly
793-96, 814 (noting that reduction of men's swimming, wrestling and gymnastics to
club or nonexistent status in order to achieve Title IX compliance is customary).
208. See id. at 808-09 (noting that more prominent men's teams such as foot-
ball, basketball and baseball remain untouched).
209. Neal, 198 F.3d 763, 767 (noting that men's interest in playing intercolle-
giate athletics is presently higher than women's).
210. See id. at 769 (reviewing precedent set forth in other relevant Ninth Cir-
cuit cases); see also id. at 769 n.5 (citingJeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
1994)) (discussing Title IX suit brought by female prisoners that contested "lack of
vocational educational programs in women's facilities relative to those available in
men's facilities."). The Neal court noted that while regulations in Jeldness were dif-
ferent than regulations in this case, the prison context was comparable because
segregation by sex is the accepted practice for prisoners and college athletes alike.
See id. at 769 n.5 (citingJeldness, 30 F.3d at 1228). The Neal court pointed out that
Jeldness rejected the idea that "differing interest levels among the genders would
justify providing women with significantly fewer educational opportunities than
men." See id. (citing Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1229).
211. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that
"physical skills are a passport to college admissions and scholarships" allowing stu-
dent-athletes to attend schools to which they would not otherwise be accepted).
212. Id. (noting opportunities gained by student-athletes).
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educational enhancement, it is therefore necessary to maintain as
many men's and women's teams as possible. 21 3
Megan K Starace
213. See Shook, supra note 4, at 793-96, 814 (noting that non-revenue men's
and women's athletic teams should receive educational opportunities equal to
sports such as football). Although the option of the reduction of roster spots on
men's athletic teams is not ideal, it would be a better alternative than the elimina-
tion of men's athletic programs in their entirety. See id.
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